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Introduction 
 
 
Negotiating with a Dis-United Kingdom 
The EU’s Options Concerning Scotland and Northern Ireland in the Brexit Talks 
Nicolai von Ondarza and Julia Becker 
As if the process or withdrawal from the European Union were not already complex 
enough in itself, the Brexit vote has also reopened constitutional questions for the 
United Kingdom. Scotland’s devolved government is calling for a new independence 
referendum and seeking a special arrangement with the EU. Northern Ireland has drawn 
less attention but is politically at least as significant: Brexit endangers its open border 
with the Republic of Ireland and consequently the stability of the peace process. These 
factors not only enormously complicate London’s negotiations with the European 
Union. Brussels and Berlin also need a strategy for their dealings with Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. Especially in order to protect the interests of its member state Ire-
land, the EU should demonstrate openness for flexible solutions. 
 
The British referendum on EU member-
ship has exposed the regional divisions 
within the “United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland”: Although 
the “leave” camp attracted 51.9 percent of 
the British electorate as a whole, it only 
actually gained a majority in England and 
Wales. 
In Scotland 62 percent voted “categori-
cally and decisively to remain within the 
European Union” (Scotland’s First Minister 
Nicola Sturgeon). And in Northern Ireland 
the remain vote reached 55.8 percent. Yet 
with England and Wales together represent-
ing almost 90 percent of the UK population, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland were unable 
to alter the outcome. 
As such, the Brexit vote has stirred up 
two politically sensitive regions. In Scot-
land, the governing Scottish National Party 
(SNP) now links the relationship with the 
EU to its calls for greater autonomy – por-
traying a hard Brexit against the will of the 
Scottish population as another manifesta-
tion of English dominance. After her calls 
for a special arrangement with the EU were 
rebuffed by the UK government, the Scot-
tish First Minister is now calling for a new 
independence referendum before the UK 
formally leaves the EU. 
A different set of difficulties exists in 
Northern Ireland, with Brexit coming at a 
juncture where clouds were already loom-
ing. Politically, the open border with the 
Republic of Ireland is a crucial pillar of the 
Northern Ireland peace process. Economi-
cally too, it is vital for both North and 
South. A hard Brexit of the kind announced 
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by Theresa May would place question marks 
over this arrangement. 
Regional Questions in the 
Withdrawal Process 
These regional tensions create additional 
complications for both sides in the immi-
nent Brexit negotiations (see SWP Com-
ment 35/2016). From the European perspec-
tive, the first question is what legal and 
political role the governments of Scotland 
and Northern Ireland (and also Wales) 
should play in the process. 
In legal terms a clear answer has already 
emerged. The British population as a whole 
voted to leave, and only the British state as 
a whole can set the withdrawal process in 
motion “in accordance with its own consti-
tutional requirements” (Article 50 TEU). The 
United Kingdom has no written constitu-
tion, and the legal position is not absolutely 
clear. A ruling by the UK Supreme Court in 
January 2017 clarified that an act of parlia-
ment is required before triggering Article 
50. Although the House of Lords initially 
proposed some amendments, in particular 
on the rights of EU citizens and the parlia-
mentary procedure to decide on a final 
Brexit deal, the British government man-
aged to get this “European Union (Notifica-
tion of Withdrawal) Bill” approved by both 
houses of the UK parliament in March 2017 
without amendments. 
The court case drew enormous public 
attention. The devolved governments of 
Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales inter-
vened to clarify whether the approval of 
their devolved legislatures was required. 
The heart of the question here is that the 
Scotland Act and the Northern Ireland Act 
both require the Scottish parliament (Holy-
rood) and the Northern Ireland Assembly 
(Stormont) to implement EU directives that 
fall within their competences. At the point 
when withdrawal actually occurs, there-
fore, both pieces of legislation will need to 
be amended. Under the Sewel Convention, 
this normally requires the consent of the 
respective devolved parliament, although 
the UK parliament retains the power to 
overrule them. The Supreme Court ruled 
that the Sewel Convention is purely politi-
cal in nature and cannot be enforced 
through the courts. Accordingly there is no 
requirement for the regional parliaments 
to approve the initiation or conclusion of 
the withdrawal process. In short: legally 
May’s government has a free hand and can 
completely ignore the devolved govern-
ments and parliaments. 
Politically, the UK government at first 
made the cohesion of the Kingdom one of 
its top political priorities. Immediately 
after her appointment as prime minister, 
Theresa May visited Edinburgh, where she 
promised to consult closely with the Scot-
tish government – and its Welsh and North-
ern Irish counterparts – on the prepara-
tions for withdrawal talks, and not to trig-
ger Article 50 until there was a “UK-wide 
approach”. In fact, the devolved govern-
ments were neither consulted nor did they 
agree with the Brexit strategy Theresa May 
laid out in January 2017, under which the 
United Kingdom will quit the single market 
and the customs union. After Holyrood 
voted against triggering Article 50 under 
these circumstances, the UK government 
and parliament decided to ignore this posi-
tion. Thus far, the devolved governments – 
including the Welsh – have dismissed the 
regular consultations in the Joint Minis-
terial Council as purely symbolic. 
Relevance for the European Union 
Looked at coldly, from the EU’s perspective 
these regional matters are first and fore-
most an internal affair of the UK state. 
Legally, the British government is the EU’s 
only negotiating partner, and politically 
London would regard direct talks between 
Brussels and the devolved governments as 
a provocation. Nevertheless, there are three 
reasons why developments in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland remain relevant for the 
EU’s negotiating strategy: 
Firstly, the EU has a fundamental inter-
est in protecting the interests of its member 
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Ireland in the Brexit negotiations. The open 
border with Northern Ireland is of central 
economic and political importance for 
the Republic of Ireland. Moreover – driven 
by its peace narrative – the EU has also 
invested significant political capital and 
financial support in the Northern Ireland 
peace process. The United Kingdom – in-
cluding Northern Ireland – is also the 
Republic’s most important trading partner. 
And under the Good Friday Agreement of 
1998 the Republic of Ireland is also closely 
involved in Northern Ireland’s institutional 
architecture (see below, p. 6). More than 
20 percent of Northern Ireland’s residents 
possess Irish – and thus EU – citizenship; in 
theory any British citizen born in Northern 
Ireland is entitled to an Irish (and thus EU) 
passport. 
Secondly, regional tensions could con-
strain London’s options in the Brexit talks. 
The British government has no interest in a 
break-up of the UK or a visible failure of the 
peace process in Northern Ireland. While 
Theresa May has to date ignored Scottish 
calls for a role in the process, a frontal con-
frontation with Edinburgh would impose 
an additional burden on her government 
during the Brexit talks. 
Thirdly, a new independence referen-
dum in Scotland would complicate the 
Brexit process for the EU side too, as the 
EU-27 would then have to take a stance on 
(re)accession for Scotland. A second refer-
endum on independence would also boost 
separatist tendencies in other EU member 
states such as Spain. 
In light of these matters, the EU side 
should not underestimate the role and 
interests of the two regions in the Brexit 
process. 
Scottish Demands 
The Scottish (minority) government led by 
First Minister Nicola Sturgeon of the Scot-
tish National Party (SNP) stated its clear 
position on the Brexit talks directly after 
the referendum: Given the clear “remain” 
vote in Scotland, it wishes to retain the 
fullest possible ties to the EU. Its positions 
and demands for the Brexit process are laid 
out in detail in a white paper published in 
December 2016, “Scotland’s Place in Europe”. 
Edinburgh’s central demand is for the 
United Kingdom to remain in the single 
market, complete with its four freedoms. 
The single market is Scotland’s most impor-
tant (non-UK) market, taking 43 percent of 
its international exports. Scotland’s agri-
culture and universities, the paper argues, 
are especially reliant on freedom of move-
ment within the EU. Scotland also calls for 
support for European solidarity, and for par-
ticipation in joint counter-terrorism meas-
ures, initiatives to curb climate change and 
exchange programmes such as Erasmus. 
With its declared objective of leaving 
the single market and the customs union 
London has clearly rejected all of Edin-
burgh’s requests. 
A special arrangement with the EU 
In the event of a “hard Brexit” involving 
the loss of full access to the internal mar-
ket, the Scottish government calls for an 
arrangement permitting Scotland to remain 
integrated in the single market and other 
EU policies on its own. Nicola Sturgeon 
believes she has a democratic mandate 
for this demand, as 62 percent of Scottish 
voters voted to remain in the EU. 
Edinburgh proposes that Scotland 
should remain part of the United Kingdom, 
but be granted the right to conclude a spe-
cial arrangement with the EU in order to 
remain inside the single market and con-
tinue to participate in other EU policies 
(such as research funding). The mechanism 
proposed is for Scotland to join the Euro-
pean Economic Area as part of EFTA, either 
in its own right or through British asso-
ciation. 
However, the “special arrangement” 
model presents considerable challenges 
from both the European and British per-
spectives. Legally such a construction is not 
impossible. Depending on a state’s consti-
tutional arrangements, individual parts 
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may possess limited legal personality 
under international law and be able to 
enter into international agreements and 
treaties. Under Article 32 of the German 
Basic Law, for example, the Länder may 
conclude treaties within the scope of their 
powers, subject to the approval of the 
federal government. The European Union 
in turn has trade and association agree-
ments with a string of overseas territories 
that belong constitutionally to four mem-
ber states (Denmark, France, the Nether-
lands, United Kingdom) but not to the EU. 
But Scotland lacks central prerequisites 
for such an arrangement. On the one hand, 
unlike the German Länder, it presently pos-
sesses no competence to conclude treaties, 
nor does it have the breadth of autonomous 
powers required to implement EU legis-
lation applicable to the single market. So 
before such a special arrangement could 
come about, the Scotland Act would have 
to be greatly expanded with the approval 
of the UK parliament to enable Scotland to 
implement the acquis in the many areas 
linked to the single market fully and in-
dependently: migration (freedom of move-
ment), competition policy, environment, 
etc. In other words, the preconditions for 
a special arrangement would have to be 
created by London and would require sig-
nificant constitutional reforms – in parallel 
to the already complex Brexit process. 
On the other hand, the existing EEA 
framework provides only for membership 
of states. Norway, for example, has already 
made it clear that Scotland could only join 
as an independent state. Similarly, separate 
inclusion in the single market would re-
quire Scotland to be able to control trade 
with the rest of the UK. So in the course of 
the negotiations the EU (and possibly also 
the EEA states) may have to decide whether 
and to what extent they are willing to con-
clude such a far-reaching agreement with 
an entity whose legal personality and com-
petences are limited by a UK that is pur-
suing a hard Brexit. 
From Brexit to Scottish independence? 
In view of these obstacles – and the im-
probability of the Conservative government 
granting such sweeping autonomy – the 
principal function of the “special arrange-
ment” proposal appears to be to prepare 
the ground for a second independence 
referendum. Indeed, even before the UK 
government formally triggered Article 50, 
Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon an-
nounced that she will start the legislative 
procedure to initiate a new independence 
referendum to be held between late 2018 
and early 2019. Before Scotland becomes 
an independent country, however, there 
are three central impediments: 
Firstly, the formal preconditions for a 
new independence referendum must be 
fulfilled. In Holyrood, the SNP minority 
government can count on the votes of the 
Scottish Greens for a majority, while the 
Scottish wings of the Labour and Conserva-
tive parties have already (for the most part) 
made their opposition clear. To hold a legally 
binding referendum Holyrood would re-
quire the consent of the UK parliament; the 
Edinburgh Agreement of 2012 granted this 
on an explicitly one-off basis for the 2014 
independence referendum. The UK govern-
ment has not rejected the idea of a second 
independence referendum outright, but so 
far seems very opposed to holding it before 
Brexit is completed.  
Even if the formal conditions are met, 
there is – secondly – no guarantee that the 
Scottish electorate would choose independ-
ence in a second ballot. Even after the Brexit 
vote, polls still showed 55 percent for re-
maining in the United Kingdom, falling to 
50 percent after the hard Brexit announce-
ment. While the SNP’s base calls vigorously 
for another referendum, the leadership will 
have to weigh the risks of a second defeat 
within such a short space of time. A new 
referendum campaign would also raise the 
same issues as in 2014, such as the currency 
question and the viability of the Scottish 
economy. Falling prices have placed the oil 
industry – as Scotland’s third-largest export 
sector – in a precarious situation. To date 
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the UK Treasury has assisted the oil and gas 
sector with tax breaks and incentives for in-
vestment in research. Commercially, Scot-
land is closely integrated with the rest of 
the United Kingdom, which receives about 
two-thirds (63 percent) of all its exports 
of goods and services. In other words, un-
impeded access to the rest of the UK is eco-
nomically more important for Scotland 
than participation in the single market. 
Not least, a Scottish independence refer-
endum – and the actual separation – would 
have to be coordinated with an already 
enormously complex EU withdrawal pro-
cess. If the referendum takes place as 
demanded by Sturgeon in late 2018 and 
the transition period needed for organising 
the secession is taken into account, Scot-
land would first need to leave the EU as 
part of the UK and then apply to rejoin 
later on. For good reasons the EU treaties 
contain no arrangements for the eventuality 
of secession by part of a member state. The 
prevailing opinion is that an independent 
Scotland would have to apply for member-
ship under the regular procedure (Article 
49 TEU), although perhaps under a “fast 
track” procedure as Scotland has already 
implemented the EU acquis. While Brexit 
makes Scotland a special case among Euro-
pean regional entities seeking independ-
ence, such a move would create a strong 
precedent with effects in particular in 
Spain (Catalonia) and therefore divide not 
only the United Kingdom but potentially 
also the EU-27. 
The Case of Northern Ireland 
Despite superficial parallels with Scotland, 
Brexit presents a quite separate set of chal-
lenges and conflicts of interest for Northern 
Ireland. Like Scotland, Northern Ireland 
voted to remain in the EU (although by a 
smaller majority, 55 percent). But with a 
population of just 1.8 million (around one-
fifth of London’s) this had only a marginal 
effect on the result. The situation in North-
ern Ireland presents three specific chal-
lenges: 
1. Hard Brexit, hard border 
The UK’s only land border with the Euro-
pean Union (apart from Gibraltar) is the 
one between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic, and the effects of a hard Brexit 
will be especially severe here. The situation 
at the border has changed enormously over 
recent decades: while the British armed 
forces conducted strict border controls 
from the 1970s to 1990s, it is now no more 
than a line on the map. This is significant 
for Northern Ireland in two senses: Politi-
cally, the open border symbolises and 
reinforces the peace process by enabling 
citizens to move freely between the two 
states. Economically, Northern Ireland and 
the Republic are closely interconnected. 
For example, trade between them generates 
about €2,8 billion annually and they run 
largely integrated electricity and gas grids. 
About 15,000 commuters cross the border 
on a daily basis for work. It is hard to see 
how it can retain that degree of openness 
after it becomes an external border of the 
European Union. 
Significantly, the open Irish border pre-
dates EU membership. Freedom of move-
ment of persons is regulated under the 
Common Travel Area (CTA), which was 
established in 1923 between the then Irish 
Free State and the United Kingdom follow-
ing Irish secession. The Republic of Ireland 
and the United Kingdom also grant their 
citizens full reciprocal voting rights (in-
dependently of EU citizenship) and those 
born in Northern Ireland have the right to 
both British and Irish citizenship. It was 
in order to preserve the CTA that Ireland 
remained outside Schengen along with the 
United Kingdom. Ireland’s Schengen opt-
out remains in force after the UK leaves, 
and would thus permit the CTA to be pre-
served. But if the UK were to tighten immi-
gration controls it would also have to do 
so in particular at the Irish border. 
At the same time, a hard Brexit would 
definitely make it necessary to control 
the movement of goods and services. If the 
United Kingdom also leaves the single mar-
ket and the customs union as Theresa May 
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has announced, Ireland at least would 
have to introduce customs controls. Even if 
the EU concludes a far-reaching free trade 
agreement with the United Kingdom, the 
origin of goods will still have to be verified. 
Services supplied across the Irish border are 
especially liable to face restrictions. But 
movement of livestock and transport of 
agricultural products – as the largest sector 
of trade between North and South – would 
certainly also require either a deep free 
trade agreement with mutual recognition 
or additional permits. And if Brussels and 
London fail to reach even a basic free trade 
agreement, tariffs will apply as well. In this 
case, the Irish Department of Finance fore-
casts a fall in exports to the UK of up to 
30 percent. The political danger here is that 
the London could publicly declare its wish 
to keep the border open, and place the 
entire blame for closure on the EU’s inflex-
ibility. 
2. Threat to the peace process 
As well as the open border, political co-
operation between Northern Ireland and 
the Republic in the framework of the 
Northern Ireland peace process is closely 
tied to both sides being members of the EU. 
The Brexit vote reveals the continuing 
divisions within Northern Ireland. While 
Northern Ireland as a whole voted with 
55.8 percent to remain in the EU, exit polls 
showed almost 90 percent of the National-
ist side voting to keep EU membership 
while two-thirds of Unionists voted leave. 
Unlike in Scotland, where all voting areas 
had a remain majority, some largely Unionist 
constituencies supported Brexit. Of the main 
two power-sharing parties (until recently), 
the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) sees 
Brexit as a shared British project, while 
Sinn Fein demands a referendum on Irish 
unification. 
The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 
does indeed provide for a “border poll”. 
The power-sharing arrangement reached 
between the United Kingdom, the Republic 
of Ireland and the main political parties in 
Northern Ireland not only ended the thirty-
year armed conflict; all the parties also 
agreed to hold a referendum on Irish unifi-
cation (a border poll) if there are indica-
tions of a majority. To date surveys suggest 
otherwise, but after the Brexit referendum 
the Irish Taoiseach Enda Kenny called for 
the option of unification – and thus bring-
ing Northern Ireland back into the EU – at 
least to be included in any withdrawal 
agreement between Brussels and London. 
Brexit will also weaken the cross-border 
bodies established in 1998. As well as in-
vesting more than €13 billion of structural 
funds in Northern Ireland since 1994, 
the EU funds civil society cooperation to 
strengthen the peace process through the 
PEACE programme. The Special EU Pro-
grammes Body, which administers the EU’s 
structural and cohesion funding jointly 
for both parts of the island is such a cross-
border body. The future of this form of 
funding and cooperation is questionable, 
especially after a hard Brexit. At the same 
time the DUP has to date refused to discuss 
the effects of Brexit in the most important 
joint political body, the North-South Minis-
terial Council. 
3. Political fragility in Northern Ireland 
The Brexit process finds Northern Ireland 
in an already fragile political state. Since 
the Good Friday Agreement and the trans-
fer of powers from London to its Executive 
and Assembly, Northern Ireland has been 
governed under a power-sharing arrange-
ment by coalitions comprising both Union-
ists and Nationalists. In 2016 three of the 
five hitherto governing parties quit the 
coalition, leaving just the DUP (pro-Brexit) 
and Sinn Fein (anti-Brexit) to run the Execu-
tive. This residual coalition itself collapsed 
in January 2017 after Sinn Fein withdrew 
in protest at wastage of government funds 
in a renewable energy scheme; First Minis-
ter Arlene Foster of the DUP is implicated 
in the scandal. 
This turn of events has immediate reper-
cussions for Northern Ireland’s role in the 
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Brexit process. Firstly, the new elections in 
early March 2017 significantly shifted the 
balance of power. The Unionists lost their 
Stormont majority for the first time, while 
Sinn Fein came within one seat of the DUP. 
Secondly, Northern Ireland finds itself 
entering the Brexit process without politi-
cal representation. If the parties fail to find 
a power-sharing agreement within three 
weeks, there will either have to be another 
election or Northern Ireland will be tem-
porarily governed from London, with all 
the symbolic consequences entailed. 
Here Brexit drives an additional wedge 
between the power-sharing parties. The 
DUP was the only major party in Northern 
Ireland to explicitly support Brexit, for 
which it campaigned aggressively both in 
Northern Ireland and in London. The Ulster 
Unionist Party (UUP) was divided, the Na-
tionalist parties supported remain. Despite 
the majority for remain in Northern Ire-
land as a whole, First Minister Foster (DUP) 
welcomed the Brexit result. After the March 
Assembly elections, parties that opposed 
Brexit now hold more than 65 percent of 
the seats. The more concrete the impact on 
Northern Ireland becomes, the greater the 
stresses and strains placed on Stormont. 
A special status for Northern Ireland? 
In view of these challenges, the possibility 
of a special status for Northern Ireland is 
being floated in both Northern Ireland and 
the Republic. The main objective would 
be to keep the border open. There are two 
aspects to this: 
Firstly, to preserve freedom of movement 
of people. The minimal objective from the 
Republic’s perspective is to keep the CTA. 
Although the CTA existed long before Ire-
land and the United Kingdom joined the 
European Union, the juxtaposition of EU 
freedom of movement against (a harder) 
British migration policy after Brexit would 
create an open door for illegal immigra-
tion. In order to preserve the CTA, the 
United Kingdom would either have to 
voluntarily refrain from immigration con-
trols on its border with the Republic, or 
conduct them on the air and sea routes 
between Northern Ireland and the British 
mainland. 
The second question relates to maintain-
ing free movement of goods and services. 
Customs controls at the Irish border become 
almost inevitable as soon as the UK leaves 
the customs union and the single market. 
The possibility of Northern Ireland remain-
ing within the EU’s customs union with a 
special status has therefore been floated 
in Ireland. Customs controls (and duties) 
would then be located not at the Irish 
border, but between Northern Ireland and 
the rest of the United Kingdom. As in the 
Scottish case, this would require greatly ex-
panded autonomy and willingness on the 
part of the EU to grant such far-reaching 
rights to a region of a third state. For North-
ern Ireland, however, this step would in-
evitably increase its distance from the rest 
of the UK and therefore be strongly opposed 
by the Unionists.  
EU Should Show Flexibility 
From the European perspective, the UK’s 
regional concerns are one among many 
issues in the complex web of Brexit prob-
lems. But analysis of the dynamics in Scot-
land and Northern Ireland clearly reveals 
that the hard Brexit emerging in the inter-
actions between the EU-27 and the May 
government will exacerbate these tensions. 
The recommendations to the European 
Union are quite different for Scotland and 
Northern Ireland: 
Despite its European ambitions, Scotland 
represents a principally domestic British 
challenge. Legally and politically, London 
negotiates withdrawal from the EU, which 
will then also apply to Scotland. Similarly, 
the questions of greater autonomy for Scot-
land (as required for a special arrangement 
with the EU), permission to hold a second 
independence referendum or implementa-
tion of the new Brexit realities are all mat-
ters for London and Edinburgh alone to 
negotiate. However, the EU should take the 
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outcome of these internal negotiations into 
account in its positioning vis-à-vis the UK. 
In the unlikely event of London agreeing 
to vastly increase Scottish autonomy, it 
would also be in the EU’s interest to con-
clude a special arrangement with Scotland. 
Given the political dynamics in the UK, how-
ever, this can only be considered a remote 
possibility. First and foremost, the EU needs 
to prepare for the scenario of a second Scot-
tish independence referendum towards the 
end of the exit negotiations. In this connec-
tion it will be crucial for Brussels to draw a 
clear distinction between the independence 
movement in Scotland and other regional 
independence movements, for example in 
Catalonia, by declaring it a special case on 
the basis of its entanglement with Brexit. 
While still maintaining that an independ-
ent Scotland would need to reapply to the 
EU, this would hold the door to Scottish EU 
membership open. 
The interests of the EU-27 are affected 
more directly in the case of Northern Ire-
land. Here too, the European Union will 
negotiate only with the United Kingdom 
as a whole, and any special status would 
require London’s consent. But especially 
in the Brexit talks, the EU should make it 
clear that it is guarding the interests of 
each and all of its members. In that connec-
tion it should also work very much more 
proactively for an acceptable solution for 
the Irish border – and prepare to support 
Ireland to cushion negative impacts asso-
ciated with a hardening. 
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